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Introduction
Motivated to find a high-impact aid mechanism to support the countries of Central America and the state of Chiapas, Mexico to improve the health of the region's poorest women and children, the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, the Carlos Slim Foundation and the Government of Spain forged a partnership with these countries and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) to provide financial rewards to countries that attain predefined performance targets within a specific timeline. While financial incentives are integrated into this results-based aid model, focusing exclusively on the program's financial incentives misses the system-strengthening element catalyzed and supported by the program and are crucial for achieving sustainable results. While earning the performance payment may be the most visible prize, a strengthened health system that can deliver services to the poorest populations and improve health outcomes is the real reward.
There are a few examples of results-based aid in the health sector, but none contain all the features included in Salud Mesoamerica Initiative (SMI): donors functioning as active members of a partnership; a development bank as administrator; a regional unit that oversees and provides technical assistance to countries; rewards for health system-strengthening metrics, in addition to health outputs and outcomes; fully independent measurement; aligned demand and supply-side incentives; and an equity focus (Eichler and Glassman 2008) . Research by Perakis and Savedoff at the Center for Global Development demonstrates that enhancing attention to outcomes appears to be a more prominent driver in SMI than other drivers (such as pecuniary interests) generally thought to be more important in a results-based initiative (Perakis and Savedoff 2015).
The quality-improvement mantra that "Every system is perfectly designed to get the results it gets" (Carr 2008 ) is directly applicable to SMI. It starts with the desired results, and then moves backwards to make adjustment to systems to achieve them. Once targets are negotiated, teams are prompted to examine the systems and processes that need to be put in place in order to achieve improvements by the deadlines established in their performance agreements. For example, some countries have agreed to reduce anemia in children under 2. To accomplish this, they needed to begin by developing new policies for nutritional supplementation for children, followed by implementation of guidelines for district managers, health providers, and community health workers and corresponding behavior change communication strategies. Products had to be added to the countries' lists of essential commodities before being procured and distributed. This process review prompts the examination and revision of supply systems to ensure the availability of key commodities.
There is a growing body of evidence indicating that investments in stronger health systems lead to improved outcomes (Hatt et al. 2015) . It is the system as a whole-the combination of different components and subcomponents and the interactions within and between them-that will determine the coverage, quality and impact of maternal, newborn and child health interventions and the impact on outcomes (Ergo et al. 2011 ). Hatt and colleagues reviewed 161 systematic reviews on the effects of health system-strengthening interventions on health outcomes in lowand moderate-income countries. Thirteen categories of interventions-all of which are represented in SMI country programs-were found to contribute to health outcomes. None of the reviews, however, include case studies where multiple elements of a health system were purposefully and simultaneously strengthened.
The SMI experience will contribute to filling this knowledge gap. SMI has set into motion a dynamic process strengthening the health systems in Mesoamerica to deliver results in maternal, neonatal and child health, family planning and nutrition for the region's poorest women and children. The complementary and mutually reinforcing factors that are driving these changes include: reputational and financial incentives; competition among participating countries; learning across national boundaries; external monitoring and the use of credible data to measure and reward results; technical assistance; and a sense of urgency created by the imposition of clear, timebound performance goals. Focusing on results at the population level has led to changes in health systems that include: government commitment; enhanced collaboration between teams within the national ministries of health and between national and local levels in the health sector; strengthened health system leadership and management at all levels; updated policies and norms focused on nutrition, maternal, newborn and child health; development and use of health information for decision-making and accountability; strengthened commodity management systems; increased demand for health services at household and community levels; and enhanced service delivery readiness. These system-strengthening measures are expected to provide the foundation to achieve improvements in maternal and child health results in subsequent phases of SMI.
The geographic focus of SMI is on the municipalities in Central America and the state of Chiapas, Mexico with the largest percentage of households in the lowest socioeconomic quintile. If the health targets set are successfully met by the conclusion of each of three phases (with each phase lasting from 18 to 24 months), SMI reimburses the government with a performance payment equal to half the amount it has contributed. These funds can then be used freely in the health sector. If, however, a country does not meet the predetermined targets for a phase, the performance payment is not provided for that phase. Phases are designed to reward a specific progression in performance-from system readiness to measured outcomes. The architects of SMI started with the end goals, working backwards to determine second-and first-phase indicators and targets that would help the countries build capacity to achieve desired outcomes by the end of the third phase. For example, if the third phase rewards reduction of anemia, the second phase rewards utilization of micronutrient powders, and the first rewards changes in policies to promote use of micronutrient powders and increase their availability in health centers.
In each phase, countries commit to achieving negotiated targets for eight to 12 indicators. These are selected from a menu of indicators that are monitored in all countries. 1 Payment of the performance tranche is conditional on achieving a score of 0.8 or better. This performance score is determined through external and fully independent measurement conducted by the Institute of Health Metrics and Evaluation (IHME) (Mokdad et al. 2015 ) and a group of regional experts. In the first phase, five countries achieved a score of 0.8 or greater and earned the performance tranche; one country fell short but was allowed to continue to the next phase; and two countries entered a remedial phase during which they achieved missed targets and were allowed to continue to the second phase without receiving the performance payment. Yet even countries that earned a score less than 0.8 made considerable improvements. Whether first-phase targets were achieved or not was determined using one-tailed Z tests that analyzed whether the result was significantly lower than the target. Attainment was considered acceptable when the Z test was not significant. Details of country performance as well as second-and third-phase indicators and targets are presented in the Annex. A detailed account of the results of the first phase as determined from external surveys has been submitted for publication elsewhere (Mokdad et al., n.d.) .
Implementation of SMI strategies is funded by a combination of domestic and donor resources (39 million USD and 41 million USD, respectively) directly invested in the region's poorest areas. Approximately half of the funding comes from external aid (from the SMI donors) and half from domestic resources (funded by loans from the IDB in some countries and by existing domestic resources in others). IDB programs are on budget, helping to improve the likelihood of sustainability. Countries that achieve a score of 0.8 or higher in each phase receive a performance payment equivalent to half of the domestic resources they dedicated to SMI activities. Because these performance payments come after costs are incurred, countries view these funds as a flexible prize, and the only conditionality is that funds are used in the health sector. In the first phase, almost $6.5 million was disbursed as part of the performance tranche.
SMI resources account for less than 1% of overall yearly expenditure in health (WHO 2014) . While it may seem to be a relatively small amount, it demonstrates the potential power of catalytic funding. It also indicates that elements such as reputational incentives and technical assistance to obtain results play a bigger role than originally thought and require further analysis.
Each country program is designed to align with national strategies to improve health for its poorest women and children. Therefore, different system elements are included in each country. For example, as El Salvador was already implementing a family health model, and Nicaragua a community platform, their participation in SMI was designed to support and strengthen these measures. Countries selected indicators from a menu that covers RMNCH, based on their priorities.
Methods
The analysis in this paper was based on recompilation of documents, literature reviews and indepth qualitative interviews. Review of numerous SMI planning and reporting documents provided insight into design decisions and progress in each country. Review of IHME external measurement reporting provided details on country results after the first operations. More than 40 key informant interviews were conducted between May and June 2015 with donors (5), IDB team leaders (8), staff of the SMI Coordinating Unit (which supports countries) (8), external evaluators (1), technical assistance (TA) providers (2), Ministry of Health officials at national and local levels (12), and district health managers (6). These provided insight into the following key areas of interest: respondents' positive and negative experiences with SMI; their perception of external measurement and the systems-strengthening TA provided; their reflections on SMI as a regional initiative; SMI effects on health systems; and their views on how the SMI model and implementation could be strengthened. Lastly, a literature review identified different approaches to measurement and verification in results-based financing schemes and the trade-offs associated with these approaches. Results were then organized and presented by the authors into healthsystem building-block elements, which in the SMI model, includes a demand-side category. In the case of indicators that could be characterized under multiple health system elements, consideration of the primary system driver was used to determine categorization. All interviews, transcription and data management were conducted by a team external to SMI to ensure that the confidentiality of key informants was respected and bias minimized.
I think we've demonstrated that big results can be obtained with little money. I mean, considering all the investments made by governments, donors and development banks, the amount invested by SMI is relatively small, especially given the results we're getting. I would be sad to see it go […] I think it is a model to be studied and followed.
-IDB Team Leader
Results
At the outset, country governments did not fully understand how the results-based aid model would work. In some cases they did not pay enough attention to the details of the composite indicators and which elements needed to change in order to achieve results within the initial 18-month timeline. Some countries lost points because one element of a composite indicator was missed, resulting in a loss for the entire indicator. Respondents at the country and support levels suggest that a better model might involve paying out for each indicator attained rather than the "all-or-nothing" approach requiring countries to achieve an overall score of 0.8.
Respondents believe that having a deadline is important for creating a sense of urgency. But an 18-month timeline is too short to assess bottlenecks, develop and implement system-strengthening changes, and achieve results. Two full years appears to be more realistic. External measurement provides credibility at both the country and donor levels that the results reported are real.
Figure 1: SMI Health System Change Framework
The SMI health system change framework, presented in Figure 1 , illustrates the elements that combine to enable countries to meet their performance targets. These include technical assistance; learning within and among countries; reputational and financial incentives; credible SMI has allowed us to integrate the different divisions of the Ministry of Health. At the beginning, we worked in an isolated fashion. Each division would carry out its own actions without any interrelations. But after working with the Initiative, the relationships, cooperation and sharing that we didn't have before solidified … and that, in my view, is the most positive experience the Initiative has had on us.
-Ministry of Health official information through external evaluation; and investments to strengthen elements of the health system. To attain SMI targets, countries altered the health system "control knobs" of financing, organization, leadership, regulation and behavior (Roberts 2008). These simultaneous adjustments triggered the changes that strengthened the performance of health system building blocks and captured the additional community/demand side element introduced by SMI (Kerr et al. 2007; Claeson et al. 2001) . Teams first selected the outcome indicators in the third and second operations (Figure 2 ), and then worked backwards to identify HSS targets that would need to be made to achieve results (Annex I). Figure 3 presents an analysis of the indicators from the first phase of SMI organized by WHO health system building blocks, including the additional "community/demand side" element that captures the demand and community interventions that are central to the SMI health system strengthening model. These indicators do not, however, capture the actions taken to drive changes to the system that are reflected in performance on the health system building block indicators. The indicators that are rewarded are those that capture the way countries are held accountable for achieving changes in these building block elements. In the first phase, most indicators were linked to leadership and governance, commodities, and service delivery building blocks. The whole system is more than the sum of its parts SMI strengthened the diverse building blocks of country health systems in preparation for achieving significant health outcome targets in subsequent phases. The number of indicators in each block varied between countries.
Leadership and governance:
The focus on achieving rewarded results was integrated into the process of how countries planned, budgeted, monitored, supervised, and held people accountable from the national to the local level. By defining precise indicators and targets that must be achieved in each phase, health sector managers were clear and well-informed about their responsibilities for achieving results within a specified timeline. The indicators that captured changes in leadership and governance include: establishment of new norms for reproductive and child health care and nutrition, communitybased strategies, and systems to report and take action on maternal death audits in Guatemala, Honduras and Mexico. As seen in Figure 3 , six of the eight participating countries have performance targets linked to this element.
The SMI focus on results catalyzed vital partnerships among Ministry of Health units and between national and local players to collectively achieve common goals. In each country, Ministry of Health officials traveled to poor communities to understand the challenges of providing services in demanding conditions. Interviews with local health managers and political leaders indicate that they experienced greater attention and commitment from the national level to solve problems in their communities. Virtually all the countries adopted new national strategies and/or norms. For example, Chiapas adopted a National Health Strategy for Indigenous Populations to drive demand by incorporating cultural sensitivity. Five countries established new norms for the delivery of micronutrients to prevent anemia in children, and some included adaptations for indigenous populations. Two countries formulated national norms for adolescent care. Two countries approved community-based service delivery platforms and formalized the roles of community health workers. In some cases, policies and norms developed for specific communities were applied nationwide, providing evidence that some system-strengthening benefits have spilled over from SMI regions to benefit the country as a whole.
Reputational incentives were also an important driver in fortifying commitments at the senior ministry level. This was apparent in the spirit of competition that surfaced when sharing results at regional health ministry meetings and at the SMI-hosted regional learning event held in Panama in November 2014. The requirement that countries submit quarterly progress reports on achieving their targets pushed government officials to focus on SMI. Turnover in senior-level leadership was discussed as a challenge by both IDB staff and country respondents. However, respondents shared that the Initiative has been strategic at cultivating high-level commitment within Central America, where political commitment is deemed crucial for success.
Information:
SMI has strengthened the generation and use of information by the participating countries. Their commitments to meet performance targets necessitated the ability to track their progress toward attainment of targets and to identify bottlenecks. As shown in Figure 3 , three countries had performance indicators linked to health information in the first operation. El Salvador received technical assistance from SMI to develop a national performance dashboard that combines and integrates data from multiple sources to generate illustrative graphs, dynamic tables, and an alert system for decision making. The dashboard enabled health officials to understand the status of diverse components at different system levels and provide timely data to inform corrective actions. Chiapas, Honduras, Costa Rica and Guatemala have made adaptive modifications to the original software to develop their own customized performance dashboards, and Panama and Belize have begun implementation. The new system in Chiapas has shortened the time between identifying a problem and arriving at a solution. In key country and support interviews, respondents point to more intensive use of health information to monitor progress, provide feedback, supervise, and take action to address gaps, driven by the desire to meet targets. 
Commodities:
All countries strengthened supply systems, as medicine, equipment and the vaccine cold chain form part of the foundation required to achieve second-and third-phase outcome targets. Countries received technical assistance that included tools to monitor stocks at the facility level and reorganized supply systems to plan, procure and distribute essential commodities. New products such as zinc, micronutrient powder, and family planning commodities were added to essential commodities lists, procured and distributed. Thus the availability of essential commodities and equipment increased substantially to deliver pre-and postnatal care, family planning, and child health services, and to manage deliveries and emergency obstetric care during the first phase (and during the performance improvement period that was extended for Guatemala and Chiapas, as illustrated in Annex I: Phase 1 Performance on Supply Indicators). Respondents from Guatemala and Chiapas indicated that their countries' bureaucratic procurement and distribution processes impeded attainment of supply targets by the first-phase deadline; however, they were able to meet these targets in the performance improvement period.
Service delivery:
SMI supported and strengthened ongoing reforms to the structure of the service delivery system already underway in some countries and stimulated new service delivery approaches in others. All countries had performance targets linked to this element in the first operation. The Initiative energized attention to preventive and promotive care, increased service delivery in remote communities, and engaged communities to stimulate demand and support selfcare. Countries also strengthened systems to manage obstetric and neonatal complications, manage child illnesses, and reach households with nutritional supplements and education to reduce child anemia.
Ongoing reforms were strengthened in El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua and Belize, and new service delivery approaches were developed and implemented in Chiapas, Guatemala, Costa Rica and Panama. For example, El Salvador's Family Health model was supported through the development of annual operational plans with monthly targets aligned with the country's SMI goals. Honduras strengthened its ongoing reform by implementing resultsbased contracting mechanisms between the Ministry of Health and autonomous hospitals, as well as between hospitals and obstetricians and pediatricians to manage obstetric and neonatal complications. In Chiapas, service delivery networks were redefined and strengthened to provide obstetric services and emergency maternal and neonatal care. Panama enhanced the delivery system to manage obstetric and newborn care in indigenous municipalities in the Comarca region. Costa Rica implemented an innovative model to provide reproductive health services to adolescents that engages multiple national institutions, which now oversee multi-sectoral Local Coordination Units that facilitate implementation of the adolescent services at local levels.
SMI has offered the possibility for us to be able to propose a model for the prevention of teen pregnancy. It allowed us to gather all the available evidence, analyze all the characteristics and conditions of Costa Rica, identify the determinants of pregnancy in the adolescent population of Costa Rica, and then propose a model. So from this point of view, it has been a good space for experimentation.
-Ministry of Health official
We now have real-time information on the supply situation, which allows us to plan proactively instead of simply reacting.
-Ministry of Health, Chiapas
Human resources:
El Salvador, Guatemala, Panama and Costa Rica selected performance indicators related to this element ( Figure 3 ). Health workers and managers were trained at the hospital, primary care and community levels to provide micronutrients to children; counsel mothers on treatment of diarrhea with zinc and ORS; identify pregnancy early to provide prompt and ongoing prenatal care; manage deliveries and complications; and provide postpartum care, family planning counseling, and child health services. Additional health workers were also hired. As shared in interviews, health workers are more motivated because supplies are available, feedback is prompt, and bottlenecks are addressed. Interviews with respondents revealed that some countries reduced turnover by providing incentives to encourage workers to remain in challenging posts.
Financing:
SMI activities were financed by a combination of domestic and donor resources that supported systems elements such as information systems, training, commodities, and labor. Two countries (Belize and Nicaragua) had performance indicators linked to this element. Chiapas and Nicaragua experimented with demand-side incentives to cover transportation costs to facilities equipped for birth care. While SMI in Nicaragua is viewed as effective, the country has expressed concern about sustaining the intervention. Budget management was described as a challenge in a number of countries, and erratic funding was experienced as a bottleneck. This challenge was confounded by a gap in time between external measurements and donor approval to fund the performance tranche, which delayed payment.
Community:
Through SMI, countries implemented interventions at the community and household levels that are not addressed by the health service delivery system, and three countries (Panama, Belize and Nicaragua) chose performance indicators linked to this element. For example, Panama was rewarded for ensuring that 100% of the targeted communities have a plan in place that specifies short-and long-term solutions to improve sanitation and water quality, and 87.5% of communities have a community birth plan. Building on an existing community strategy, Nicaragua was rewarded because 95% of municipal health units in SMI-targeted municipalities entered into social agreements on community health and well-being with local health committees. As countries enter the second phase, they are devoting more efforts to household education and behavior change because the countries have recognized that health is impacted at the community level and that self-care is an important cornerstone in an effective health system, particularly in poor and marginalized communities.
Social contracts for community health and well-being are agreements between the community and family health team serving that community. They contain actions to meet the indicators, the key indicators of the health team, and actions of health promotion and prevention. The social contracts systematize and encapsulate all the health actions into a single strategy. For me, this is the most promising action of the Initiative. It is sustainable, I believe. It empowers the community, and the results can be seen in the short and medium term.
-Local health manager
The health units that handle deliveries give the women one transportation voucher to receive birth control … and another at the time of her delivery (either to go to a maternity care home or directly to the health unit). This intervention may be highly effective, but in my view it creates too much dependency, comes at a high cost, and is unsustainable.
-Local health manager, Nicaragua
Participants' reflections and perceptions of the SMI results-based model
Qualitative research confirms that countries' buy-in of SMI was not only due to the promise of funds paid conditional on results, but also that their attainment had a deadline. According to key informant interviews, external measurement was an additional driver that convinced countries that the results-based aid model has teeth while providing assurance to donors that their money is paying for verified results.
In order to achieve population level results, countries had to make adjustments to their health systems. Although countries have outcomes in common in the second and third phases, each country chose distinct HSS elements in the first phase to focus on in order to meet their targets, tailoring needs to their own systems.
Results-based management was described in interviews as a new model that is viewed as catalytic. Targets crystalize goals; the requirement to meet targets in a specific time period provides focus; and funding conditional on attainment of targets-along with the high visibility inherent in such a multinational initiative-keeps health sector actors determined. Stakeholders report that SMI has spawned new dialogue and partnerships across national-level units in the Ministry of Health and between national and local and community levels. Technical support provided by the IDB and SMI Coordinating Unit in Panama City and by two international firms contracted to support countries has increased country capacity. New evidence-based strategies and results-oriented interventions are holding health sector actors accountable, and supply systems have been strengthened as a result of deeper process analysis and the actions they inform.
While respondents from participating countries are generally positive about their experiences with SMI, they also describe challenges arising from the model's structure and how it intersected with their own health systems. Respondents felt that the 18-month period for the first phase was too short and was inconsistent with annual budgeting processes. At the outset, faulty understanding of what improvements would be feasible hindered the leaders' ability to negotiate targets in an informed way. Countries launched the Initiative with only a partial understanding of what needed to happen in order to meet first-phase targets, compounded by slow-moving Ministries of Health with weak capacity and unmotivated health personnel, unaccustomed to working in teams and
The first challenge was overcoming the apathy and doubt that SMI could really change the indicators. At the end of the day, the indicators are ambitious: reduce maternal mortality after 20 or 30 years of intense effort with no significant impact. Then along comes SMI, and you're told that in five years we will reduce maternal mortality, and your first reaction is one of disbelief, right? Our first challenge has been to instill faith in people; to ensure that SMI, through its own actions, can truly reduce those indicators. I believe we have met this challenge and people now believe in us.
-Ministry of Health official
In other assistance programs it is more a one-sided type technical assistance. They come and offer you what they think is important for you. I feel like in this particular situation it was the other way around. We saw some needs and we were offered the opportunity to access technical assistance. I think that works so much better. With other projects, the external agency comes and says well you know we will give you this kind of technical assistance and countries tend to accept just because it is available.
unused to being held accountable for results. Supply systems did not function properly, and countries often lacked the knowledge or will to fix them. While countries reported that it was a challenge to meet the first-phase targets, they also shared that the Initiative's time-bound nature pushed them to solve bottlenecks and hold people accountable for achieving results. In addition to a being a driver of performance, measurement in SMI is also an enabler, as countries received technical assistance to develop monitoring systems (called performance dashboards) to track performance in real time using routine health information systems. Such information is invaluable in solving problems that impede attainment of targets. Technical assistance was provided through the SMI Coordinating Unit, two contracts with external firms, and IDB team leaders. Technical assistance includes areas such as: planning, logistics, information systems, evidence-based norms, and health worker capacity-building. What makes SMI's technical assistance model different from the standard donor-funded model is that it is primarily demanddriven. Countries requested assistance because they realized they needed help to strengthen their systems to achieve the rewarded results.
Conclusions
SMI is a RBA model that has catalyzed system change by focusing on population-based outcomes. Although in the first operations each country emphasized distinct elements of the health system as captured by the rewarded indicators, these system enhancements were necessary to prepare countries for the second and third operations. Given the starting point of the health systems, changes in the health system were a necessary predecessor to changes in health results. Money alone, however, was not enough to make these changes; teams value the technical assistance that accompanied these system changes. The decision to reward system-readiness indicators in the first phase was taken because experts from the IDB who work closely with these countries and donors who support the Initiative believed that to start with systems targets was a necessary step to strengthen health systems in order to improve outcomes in subsequent phases. Another option might have been to begin the first phase with utilization, content of care, and outcome indicators, rather than the current predominance of service-readiness indicators. If incentives were a powerful enough driver, the desire to achieve the results might have catalyzed countries to strengthen underlying systems even without direct incentives linked to systemstrengthening metrics.
At first, SMI seemed like a controlled structure for disbursing donations. But later we started discovering all the positive things provided by the Initiative. We got used to the issue of accountability, because we often have investment or donations, and we don't see any results. Here in SMI, however, we work on monitoring indicators and verifying the attainment of goals and return on the investments and donations. The result in this case was for the welfare of the population.
-Ministry of Health official
At first, people viewed the Initiative as a burden. They thought it was an addition to their work. Little by little they began to see that it was part of what they already do day to day, but with a different planning system. So now they view the Initiative differently. The idea of recognizing and rewarding local health care teams' performance is very important and has increased team motivation and helped SMI meet its public goals.
I think several factors were at play; the rules were clear but there was some variation in the way indicators and targets were negotiated. I don't think there was full understanding among the parties. I think there was a little bit of blind negotiation.
-IDB Team Leader
One powerful piece of evidence that countries value SMI's results-based aid model is that the three countries that did not attain the first-phase performance tranche continued to participate in SMI. These countries value the changes that have been catalyzed and the opportunity to learn from other countries in the region.
Most respondents believe that, at a minimum, the health system modifications not dependent on ongoing domestic financing will be sustained. Such modifications include policy and guideline changes; results-based management; use of information for decision-making; and improved obstetric, newborn and nutrition care. In some countries, these changes have expanded beyond the SMI-targeted municipalities. While most respondents expressed optimism about strengthened supply systems, some are not certain that their governments will continue to procure sufficient commodities and expressed doubt about whether support for demand-side transportation vouchers will be sustained. A potential countervailing factor is that communities may pressure their governments to continue to provide the higher-quality services they have experienced through the Initiative.
Results-based aid is much more than a financial incentive. In fact, reputational incentives may be even more important, as countries care about performance in front of their peers and high-profile donors. Metrics, information, financial incentives, external measurement, demand-driven technical assistance, and the requirement to achieve results in alignment with national strategic priorities appear to provide the glue that drives the strengthening coordination of systems. In future periods, the global community will learn whether these system changes lead to improved health outcomes in the allotted timeframe.
The focus on results in the SMI results-based aid model is driving countries in Mesoamerica to strengthen their health systems in a comprehensive way. A myopic focus on each building block misses the benefits of this comprehensive approach and its influence on the attitudes and behaviors of the many people who comprise the health system and the ways in which they collaborate to solve problems and deliver services. As system changes become imbedded, health system actors may consider the results orientation as a new normal, which will contribute to scaling-up and sustainability.
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